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II.  ARGUMENT IN REPLY
The state advances two arguments in support of the trial court’s decision. 
Neither one has merit.
First, it misstates the holding of Quemada v. Arizmendez, 153 Idaho 609, 616,
288 P.3d 826, 833 (2012), as “a court is not obliged to search a record for evidence to
support of motion.”  State’s Brief, p. 5.  In fact, that case only addresses motions for
summary judgement and states that “the trial court is not required to search the
record looking for evidence that may create a genuine issue of material fact; the
party opposing the summary judgment is required to bring that evidence to the
court's attention.”  Id., quoting Vreeken v. Lockwood Eng'g, B.V., 148 Idaho 89, 103-
104, 218 P.3d 1150, 1164-65 (2009) (in turn quoting Esser Electric v. Lost River
Ballistics Tech., Inc., 145 Idaho 912, 919, 188 P.3d 854, 861 (2008)).  A motion for
summary judgment, of course, is not the same as the motion here, and the state
cites to no authority that a party seeking permission to conduct discovery may not
rely upon the information already within the files and records of the case.  The
state’s citation to Venable v. Internet Auto Rent & Sales, Inc., 156 Idaho 574, 584,
329 P.3d 356, 366 (2014), is also not apposite because in a motion to reconsider
under I.R.C.P. 11(a)(2)(B) “the burden is on the moving party to bring the trial
court’s attention to the new facts.”  Id.  By contrast, the court’s task here was to
determine whether the requested discovery was needed to establish one of the
pleaded claims in the petition.  In order to make that determination, the court
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needed to know what the claims were.  If anything, the trial court had an
affirmative duty to examine the record.  See Esser Elec. v. Lost River Ballistics
Techs., Inc., 145 Idaho at 919, 188 P.3d at 861. (“The trial court must examine the
pleadings to determine what issues are raised in the case [when ruling upon a
motion for summary judgment].”)  Had the district court reviewed the pleadings to
determine whether the requested discovery was “necessary to protect an applicant’s
substantial rights,” as required by Griffith v. State, 121 Idaho 371, 375, 825 P.2d 94,
98 (Ct. App.1992), it would have seen Mr. Cardoza’s sworn statement about the
existence of the videorecording.
It should be remembered that the district court required Mr. Cardoza to
proceed without counsel on the claims raised in his pro se petition and consequently
the motion for permission to conduct discovery was a pro se pleading.  R 98; 133.
See, Johnson v. State, 85 Idaho 123, 128, 376 P.2d 704, 706 (1962) (“in dealing with
petitions for habeas corpus submitted by persons on their own behalf without the
advice, aid and assistance of counsel, a court cannot require the same high
standards that might be imposed on members of the legal profession. In general,
liberality rather than strictness should control in considering an application for a
writ of habeas corpus.”) Further, the court denied the motion without holding a
hearing where Mr. Cardoza could have drawn the court’s attention to his sworn
statement.  R 139.
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Second, the state argues that Mr. Cardoza’s verified statement that he “ha[d]
contacted the security at Karcher Mall, they have the DVD available, but need an
order from the Court in order to release it,” (R 20, ft. 2) does not support a finding
that the tape exists or who is in possession of it because it is “inadmissible hearsay.” 
State’s Brief, p. 6.  This is truly an absurd argument because the purpose of the
motion to conduct discovery is to obtain admissible evidence.  The state cites to no
authority that a request to conduct discovery must be based upon the petitioner’s
personal knowledge of the existence or contents of the item sought.  Sometimes the
item sought may not exist or may have been destroyed or discarded.  There is no
reason why the court may not issue a subpoena duces tecum for an item even
though its existence has not been conclusively established.  The entity receiving the
subpoena can simply respond that it is unable to provide the item because it is not
in its possession.  To the extent the court denied the request for discovery on that
basis, it failed to reach its conclusion by an exercise of reason.  Thus, it abused its
discretion.  Sun Valley Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803
P.2d 993, 1000 (1991).
  III.  CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above and in the Opening Brief, Mr. Cardoza asks
this Court to vacate the denial of his petition and remand the matter so that the
requested discovery may be conducted.
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Respectfully submitted this 27  day of October, 2016.th
_____/s/_________________________
Dennis Benjamin
Attorney for Martin Cardoza
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